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Abstract
The Chinese government has implemented a means-tested social
security net for the poorest known as dibao. We compare dibao
legislation from the State Council, the Shandong provincial
government, and the Qingdao municipal government. As a case
study, this comparative analysis of dibao legislation across
different state levels and time periods provides a method to
analyse differences between central and local government levels.
We show that local governments are able to subvert the intentions
of the central government by adding sections and altering the
language in key passages. This type of horizontal and vertical
reading of multiple texts reveals priorities and differences between
government levels in ways that are not apparent in any single text.

Keywords dibao, minimum living standard, welfare policy,
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Central Government Poverty Policy and Local
Deviation: A Comparison of Dibao Regulations
across State Levels

Maja Kolmos and Christopher Rosenmeier
Introduction
Since the 1990s, China has been implementing wide-scale reforms
of the social security system. Pensions, health care, unemployment
insurance, and poverty alleviation schemes are tested and
implemented as the government tries to ensure broader social
welfare coverage. Targeting the very poorest, the government has
implemented a welfare programme known as dibao (zuidi shenghuo
baozhang zhidu 最最最最最最最最), also called the Minimum Living
Standard or Minimum Livelihood Guarantee. In principle, the
programme is intended to ensure near-universal coverage,
excluding only those without local hukou (户户) registration, such
as migrant workers. Benefits are low and only intended to ensure a
subsistence-level living standard. Unlike higher tier welfare
programmes in urban areas, dibao is non-contributory, so any
household with an income below the local threshold should be
eligible. Poverty lines are set locally and vary enormously, but
they are mostly set to only meet subsistence needs.
Dibao payments take households up to this poverty line, but
not above it. Dibao was first implemented in urban areas in urban
areas in the late 1990s, and in recent years it has been expanding
rapidly in the countryside as well. The expansion into rural areas
is still a fairly recent phenomenon, and it will not be covered
further here. This study refers to the dibao urban programme only.
The discussion aims to analyse and compare dibao policy texts
1
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from central and local government levels across time. We call this
a horizontal and vertical reading. As a research methodology,
comparative policy analysis is most often carried out at the
national level. The policies of nations are compared in terms of
cost, outcomes, and various other parameters. But China with its
decentralized implementation of welfare policy also provides an
interesting case for comparative analysis between government
levels and regions. Usually government laws and regulations
originate from the central government in Beijing and are then
disseminated and copied with minor variations by local
governments at provincial and lower levels. Since lower level texts
are largely copied from the higher level document, we argue that it
is the variations between texts that are particularly interesting.
Regulations concerning dibao from the State Council will be
compared with those from Shandong province and Qingdao
municipality 青青市. Analysis of social welfare programmes, such
as dibao, provides an interesting perspective on the relationship
between Chinese state levels. The government has centralized the
management of social security under the Ministry of Labour and
Social Security, but the responsibility for implementing the
programmes is usually transferred to local governments and
municipalities. This decentralization of social welfare provisioning
has made local governments the main actors in accumulating
funds, redistributing resources, and running welfare systems. This
decentralized system can potentially create a divide between the
intentions of the central government that designed the programme
and the local government implementing it and paying for it. Local
governments have different priorities and fiscal capacities.
Qingdao was partly chosen due to the easy access to documents
through government websites and partly due to the city making
fairly average dibao payments as shown below.
2
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Usually any tension between local and central government
levels is relegated to private discussions between various
government actors. This study finds that legal documents
concerning social welfare programmes reveal some of these
tensions as local governments alter the wordings provided from
the State Council, even to the extent of fundamentally
undermining their intent. More generally, this is a case study on
how to interpret social welfare legislation, concluding that
comparative analyses of such documents can reveal frictions
between government levels that are not apparent in any single text.

Programme Expansion and Limitations
During the 1990s, a number of cities established their own dibao
programmes. The first implementation was set up in Shanghai in
1993 (Tang, 2003/4). The Shanghai model was based on a fixed
monthly payment and a rations system which gave recipients
access to subsidized goods. Funding was shared by the municipal
government and employers. Wuhan adopted dibao in 1996 and set
up a simpler system funded entirely by the government. Half the
funding came from the municipal level and each district provided
the other half. In both the Shanghai and Wuhan models people
still capable of working or who had working family members were
excluded, regardless of their actual level of income. In 1996,
Chongqing implemented dibao as well, making it available to all
registered citizens, regardless of age and working ability. The
programme expanded quickly supported by the Ministry of Civil
Affairs (Guan and Xu, 2011). Larger cities like Xiamen, Dalian,
Qingdao, Fuzhou and Guangzhou all implemented some sort of
dibao programme. These experiments were used as the basis for

3
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the dibao system eventually adopted by the State Council (Tang,
2003/4).
In 1997, the State Council issued a circular requesting all
cities to implement dibao for urban residents by the end of 1999
(State Council, 1997). Two years later, the State Council
promulgated

a

list

of

regulations

standardizing

the

implementation of the programme and stressing income as the
sole criterion of eligibility (State Council, 1999). At the central level,
Li Peng (李李) and later Zhu Rongji (朱朱朱) played major roles in
supporting the adoption and promotion of dibao (Hammond,
2011). After the State Council’s support of the programme in 1997,
the adoption of dibao expanded rapidly. By the end of September
1999, 668 cities and 1,638 county governments had implemented
some form of dibao, but the actual number of recipients remained
extremely low. According to J. C. B. Leung (2003), only one-third
of the eligible poor were covered. Martin Ravallion and Shaohua
Chen (2004) estimate the proportion at about a quarter. Many cities
adopted the programme more or less in name only, and it was not
until 2001 that there was a real breakthrough in the expansion of
coverage (Tang, 2003/4). The number of dibao recipients increased
from 4 million in 2000 to 22.5 million people in 2003. This increase
correlated with the central government’s decision to subsidize
local governments’ dibao expenditure. In 2003, the central
government’s share of dibao expenditure reached 61.3% (World
Bank, 2009). The number of recipients has more or less remained
around 22 million since 2003, amounting to about 6% of the urban
population.
Since the dibao benefit line is calculated in accordance with
local socio-economic conditions, it varies dramatically between
regions. The highest poverty lines are to be found in coastal
regions and the lowest in the western and central provinces. In
4
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2010, the dibao income line spanned from 156 to 450 RMB (US$25
to $73) per month, with Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, and Shenzhen
at the top and Urumqi and Xining at the bottom. Qingdao’s dibao
line was set at RMB 350 (US$57) per month (Ministry of Civil
Affairs, 2010).
Several problems with the implementation of dibao have
been raised over the last few years. Athar Hussain (2003b) points
out that dibao is too minimal in its coverage to function as the only
safety net of last resort. Similarly, Wang Ya Ping (2004) and Guan
Xinping (2003) note that dibao only covers the most basic living
costs, such as food and clothing, and that the programme is unable
to lift people out of poverty. Due to low local capacity, local
governments have tightened the qualification criteria for receiving
dibao (Hussain, 2003a). Furthermore, there have been different
understandings of eligibility criteria by local governments, street
offices, and local cadres. There has been a tendency to apply the
narrowest understanding of the concept (Tang, 2003/4). Some
places have excluded all people of working age, regardless of their
financial situation. In direct contradiction of central policy, Cho
Min Young (2010) finds that local officials in Harbin still mainly
use inability to work as the criterion for eligibility, not income. As
a result, many eligible poor are not covered. Wuhan and other
cities have set up other additional criteria of exclusion from the
programme (Solinger, 2011). Peter Saunders and Xiaoyuan Shang
(2001) note other problems, including the lack of coordination
between dibao and other social security programmes. These
problems are partly due to dibao emerging as a compromise
between different actors at different state levels (Hammond, 2011).
While there are now several good studies analysing the
shortcomings in the practical implementation of dibao and how
local authorities undermine the State Council’s directives in
5
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practice, very little has been said on central-local differences in the
programme’s legal framework.

The Chinese Official Documents to be Studied
The principal focus of this study is on dibao government
regulations, such as the State Council documents that stipulate the
form, structure, and purpose which lower government levels are
expected to adhere to. We also look at local documents from the
provincial and municipal levels. The local materials will be limited
to Shandong province and its Qingdao municipality. The
following list enumerates the main source materials analysed in
this study, starting with the shorter names that will be used for
clarity:
1. State Council Circular: State Council Circular Concerning the
National Establishment of Dibao for Urban Residents,
National Document (1997) No. 29 (Guowuyuan guanyu zai
quanguo jianli chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang zhidu de
tongzhi,

guofa

(1997)

29

hao,

(1997)

29,《国国国国国国国国国国国市国国最最最最最最最最国国

知》(国国[1997]29号)) (State Council, 1997).
2. State Council Regulations: Dibao Regulations for Urban
Residents (Chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang tiaoli,

国市国国最最最最最最城城) (State Council, 1999).
3. Shandong Circular: Circular by the People's Government of
Shandong Province on Accelerating the Establishment and
Completion of Dibao for Urban Residents in Accordance
with National Document (1997) No. 29 (Shandong sheng
renmin zhengfu guanyu guanche guo fa (1997) 29 hao wenjian
jiakuai jianli he wanshan chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang
6
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山山山山国山山国国山山国国 (1997)
29号号号号号国国号号号国市国国最最最最最最最最国国知)
zhidu

de

tongzhi,

(Shandong Provincial Government, 1997).
4. Shandong Measures: Shandong Province Measures for the
Implementation of “Dibao Regulations for Urban Residents”
(Shandong sheng shishi “chengshi jumin zuidi shenghuo baozhang
tiaoli” banfa, 山山山山山《国市国国最最最最最最城城》办办)
(Shandong Provincial Government, 2001).
5. Qingdao Rules: Qingdao Municipal Rules on Dibao for Urban
Residents (Qingdao shi chengshi jumin zuidi shenguo baozhang
gongzuo

guiding,

青青市国市国国最最最最最最青青青青)

(Qingdao Municipal Government, 2004).
This crosscut of dibao regulations allows a comparative approach,
allowing both vertical and horizontal readings that reveal changes
over time as well as differences between levels of government. The
analysis demonstrates the degree to which local governments are
able to subvert the intentions and visions of the centre in their
implementation of the programme.
Legally, the 1997 State Council Circular is no longer relevant
since it has been superseded by the 1999 Regulations, but it is
interesting to review since it reveals a trend in the thinking of the
State Council as well as in the relationship between local and
central governments. In fact neither the Circular nor the Regulations
is strictly legally binding, but regulations are the last step by the
State Council before being given the status of actual law (Thelle,
2004). Both types of documents show the will of the central
government, and therefore they are generally heeded by lower
levels of the administration.

7
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Critique of the State Council Circular
The State Council signalled its official endorsement of the local
dibao schemes with the Circular in 1997. The Circular set out the
main governing principles for dibao and establishes a timetable for
the rollout of the programme on a national scale. It is stipulated
that by the end of 1997, all cities should have completed the
preparatory work; by the end of 1998, all local cities should have
implemented dibao; and by the end of 1999, dibao should be
implemented in all urban areas at village level or above. Two
aspects of the Circular are worth considering more detail: eligibility
and the role of local governments. The document specifies that all
registered urban residents are eligible to receive dibao payments,
but three groups are singled out for special attention:
1. Residents with no source of income, without working
ability, legal providers, or carers.
2. Residents

on

unemployment

funds

or

whose

unemployment funds have run out, but still have not
found work again, and whose average family income
is below the minimum living standard line.
3. Employed or laid-off residents as well as pensioners
who after receiving the minimum wage or basic
living allowance or pensions still have average
household incomes below the minimum living
standard line (State Council, 1997)
These three groups are considered particularly deserving, so the
phrasing might seem to indicate that other groups, such as private
entrepreneurs, are to receive a lesser degree of attention. The three
groups emphasized are the traditional “three no’s” in category one
and current or former work unit employees in categories two and
8
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three. This focus indicates that dibao was principally seen as a
measure to fill the welfare gap that had appeared as the work unit
system of social welfare was being dismantled.
The Circular further stipulates that local governments are
responsible for implementing and financing dibao and they should
cooperate with various departments—personnel, statistics, and
labour in the implementation, screening, logistics, and financing of
dibao. They should put dibao payments into their regular budgets.
The threshold and benefit levels are determined by local
governments according to local price levels and fiscal capacity.
Every locality must practically and realistically set a
protection standard that both conforms to the
principles

of basic

living and is beneficial to

overcoming a dependency mentality in accordance
with the costs of basic living necessities and financial
capacity (State Council, 1997).
The reference to local fiscal capacity allows a great degree of
autonomy in determining benefit levels. The concept of living
necessities is very vague. This allows for a wide degree of
interpretation and is practically a carte blanche for local
governments to set benefit lines as they wish. Athar Hussain
argues (2003a) that the wide variations in local poverty lines are
primarily due to varying local fiscal capacity, not differences in
local price levels.
Various other criteria are specified in the Circular as well.
Eligibility should be calculated according to the applicants’
average household income, and payments should only make up
for the difference up to the local dibao threshold. Other parties are
also called upon to assist the poor. There is an appeal to traditional
9
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values, such as the young helping the elderly and family members
supporting each other. The Circular is a preliminary step in
implementing a more comprehensive welfare system, and at the
same time it represents a clear break from other social welfare
reforms, particularly since it establishes a non- contributory
scheme. All in all, local governments are called upon to carry the
burdens of cost and implementation, but in return, they get a high
degree of autonomy and control over details.

Analysis of the State Council Regulations
The dibao programme was defined more stringently by the State
Council on 28 September 1999 with the promulgation of the Dibao
Regulations for Urban Residents. This document stipulates the form,
content, and procedures of dibao going into effect from 1 October
1999. Overall, it is concerned with the same aspects as the Circular
from 1997, but it goes into much greater detail and consequently it
is about twice as long. It expands programme coverage and
restricts the autonomy of local governments considerably
compared to the 1997 Circular. The text consists of 17 main articles
which describe various details of implementation.
As in the Circular, the Regulations stresses that dibao shall
secure a minimum living standard for its urban residents. Notably,
it becomes a “right” (quanli, 权权) to receive dibao for urban
households under the living standard line already in article two.
The upgrading of dibao to a civil right is a significant qualitative
change compared to its unclear status in the 1997 Circular. Urban
citizens can now legally apply for dibao benefits. This empowers
citizens and is clearly intended to reduce the power of local
governments. The Regulations also removes references to the three
groups that were singled out for special attention in the Circular. In
10
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many cases, local cadres were limiting dibao benefits to the “three
no’s” group that earlier constituted the bulk of social welfare
recipients (Tang, 2003/4). By no longer highlighting specific
categories of poverty, the new regulations are targeting more
broadly.
Household income is specified more precisely as the
household’s total income and income in kind, including general
support, child support, alimony payments, etc. The Regulations no
longer refers to traditional Chinese virtues, but there is still a
reliance on household members to take care of each other as
contributions from legal carers, foster parents, and others are
factored into household income (art. 2). The only excluded income
is special care to disabled servicemen and the special pensions for
family of revolutionary martyrs. These groups are privileged for
political reasons.
The Regulations sets far more stringent standards in
determining benefit lines than the Circular. Local governments
shall set the local dibao line together with city government
departments for finance, statistics and commodity prices. Article 6
says:
The dibao standard should be set according to local
costs of food, clothing, and housing necessary to
maintain a basic urban living. It should take into
consideration costs for water, electricity, coal (gas) as
well as compulsory education fees for minors (State
Council, 1999).
A significant difference is the removal of the reference to local
fiscal capacity. Together with the detailed specification of how the

11
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dibao line should be calculated, the changes here give local
governments less freedom to set the benefit line as they please.
Application procedures are changed as well. It is specified
that dibao applicants should receive a response in writing within
30 days of their application, and they have a right to appeal if their
application is rejected (art. 8). Rejections should be submitted in
writing with an explanation of why the applicant did not qualify.
The requirement that rejections should be justified in a timely
manner and subject to review puts greater pressure on denying
instances. This again upgrades the rights of applicants vis-à-vis
local governments.
It is stipulated that the Ministry of Civil Affairs in Beijing
holds the overall responsibility for dibao (art. 4), while local
governments are responsible for the practical implementation.
This is much like in the Circular, but duties and responsibilities of
the different departments are clarified. Local governments above
county level are responsible for the implementation and
administration of dibao. Neighbourhood committees and local
township governments are responsible for the supervision,
approval, and examination of dibao applicants. Local governments
are still responsible for covering the financial costs of dibao, but
they are now mandated to set up special funds earmarked for the
programme in their regular budgets (art. 5). In addition,
government should encourage organizations and private persons
to contribute financially (art. 6).
There are new sections on code of conduct and application
procedures in the Regulations. Dibao workers must satisfy a
number of requirements and there is a list of punishable offences,
including graft, favouritism, and misappropriation of funds (art.
13). Local governments are responsible for ensuring that dibao
workers live up to these criteria and implement the programme
12
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properly. Other changes in the Regulations add to the burden of
applicants and beneficiaries. Eligibility checks are specified in
some detail and make application cumbersome and unpleasant for
the applicant (art. 7):
In order to examine the need for dibao remuneration,
the office in charge of examination and approval can
verify and check the economic conditions and actual
living standard of applicant households through
household investigations, interviews with neighbours,
written testimonies, etc. The applicant as well as
relevant units, organizations and individuals must
accept this investigation and should disclose relevant
circumstances truthfully (State Council, 1999).
A full list of the names of all successful applicants should be made
public so the public can make complaints about faults, hidden
incomes, etc. (art. 9).
For urban residents who have already been approved
to receive dibao benefits, the administrative approval
authority should adopt the appropriate form for public
announcement about the household in order to receive
the supervision of the masses. Any person can raise
objections to the administrative approval authority
about dibao recipients who do not fulfil the legal
conditions (State Council, 1999).
It appears that the application procedure is designed to be a
humiliating public spectacle. This is in order to increase the
transparency of the programme, but it also has the effect that the
13
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recipients’ degree of economic helplessness is made known
throughout the local community. These government procedures
are supposedly in place to ensure that nobody receives dibao
without being truly without other means of income, but they also
seem to be deliberately stigmatizing.
Overall, the Regulations document has the effect of
standardizing the programme and giving applicants more rights
vis-à-vis local governments. There is an emphasis on procedural
expansion and standardization, and this fits well with the central
government’s proclaimed intentions for greater social welfare
coverage and the unspoken attempt at strengthening its control
over the local authorities. Compared with the Circular, the
Regulations represent a shift in the State Council’s approach as
access to dibao becomes a right, and applicants gain recourse to
complaint procedures, notification in writing, etc. Similarly, by
removing the Circular’s focus on a few select groups, coverage is
expanded to include all urban residents below the local poverty
line. In addition, the determination of the dibao poverty line is
specified in greater detail and no longer refers to local state
capacity. The demand for the inclusion of dibao expenditure in
local budgets means that local governments no longer have the
right to prioritize other expenses and claim that the remaining
funds are insufficient to finance welfare programmes. It seems
clear that one of the primary concerns of the State Council has
been to limit the autonomy of local governments in implementing
dibao.

14
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Policy Implementations in Shandong Province and
Qingdao Municipality
The implementations of the dibao programme at local levels have
taken various forms and shapes, but invariably the legislation
echoes the shape and form of the State Council documents. In the
following, local documents from Shandong are studied with
examples from two different levels: the Shandong provincial
government and Qingdao municipality.
At the Shandong provincial level, the legal documents on the
dibao programme have followed the lead of the State Council
fairly

closely.

The

Shandong

Province

Circular

on

the

implementation of the State Council Circular was issued on 11
November 1997, two months after the State Council document
(Shandong Provincial Government, 1997). Like the State Council
Circular, the Shandong Circular is not legally binding. Since the
wording is largely copied verbatim from the State Council
document, the document is little more than a declaration of
support.
In the first article, the Shandong Circular specifies that dibao
in the province should be implemented according to the State
Council Circular and the spirit of the 15th Party Congress. The only
changes are the specification of a range for dibao benefits and the
setting of an earlier deadline for implementation at all subprovincial levels. The deadline for full implementation is moved
forward to the first quarter of 1998, much earlier than the State
Council deadline set at the end of 1999. It is specified that the
monthly benefit level should be set between 100 and 140 RMB
(US$16 and $23) according to local prices and local fiscal capacity
(art. 3). Apart from the specification of a monetary range, the
reasoning and wording are copied directly from the State Council
document.
15
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In 2001, the Shandong Measures was promulgated by the
Shandong government (Shandong Provincial Government, 2001).
In the first article, it states that its purpose is to standardize dibao
in the province in accordance with the State Council’s Regulations
from 1999. At 21 articles, the Shandong Measures is considerably
longer than the Regulations or the Shandong Circular which only
had 7 articles.
On the whole, the Shandong Measures is a rehash of the State
Council Regulations with a number of elaborations to clarify
difficult cases. For example, it is specified that if household
incomes are irregular, an average of the past three months should
be used (art. 3). The calculation of household income is specified in
considerably greater detail, with a list of what is included (art. 4)
and excluded (art. 5) from household income. Compared to the
Regulations, aid to poor students and certain social security
payments to civil servants are excluded from income calculations,
so those groups are better off here. Unlike the Shandong Circular,
there is no longer a specification of a dibao benefit range. Instead,
the calculation should reflect local prices of food, clothing, etc. (art.
7).
More interestingly, the Shandong Measures differs from the
Regulations by paying no attention to regulating the conduct of
dibao workers. The entire section is omitted. This perhaps
indicates that the provincial government is less concerned with the
rights of applicants and misappropriation of funds. The timing of
the document’s promulgation is also worthy of note. Where the
first provincial circular followed the 1997 State Council Circular
within a few months, the Shandong Measures did not arrive until
October 2001—a full two years after the State Council Regulations
from 1999. It is tempting to interpret this delay as a sign of
disaffection with increasing central state control over the
16
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programme. The timing of the Shandong Measures coincides with
the central government increasing its share of dibao financing. It
seems that this change prompted the Shandong provincial
government to implement the dibao programme more vigorously
and support its implementation by issuing the Shandong Measures.
Eligibility was somewhat restricted in June 2004 when the
provincial government issued a new document which further
specifies the working of dibao within the province, Shandong
Province Guidelines for Dibao Work (Shandong sheng chengshi jumin
zuidi shenghuo baozhang gongzuo guifan 山山山国市国国最最最最

最最青青青保) (Shandong Provincial Government, 2004). This
document raises eligibility criteria in various ways. In straight
contradiction with the State Council legislation, a number of
groups are listed as ineligible to receive dibao payments (art. 8)
including those who have recently moved to homes with an area
exceeding 30 percent of the local average, those who have recently
bought computers, cameras, pianos or other expensive goods,
people who speak too much on mobile phones, incorrigible
gamblers, drug addicts, etc. In other articles, various conditions for
screening applicants are listed.
By comparison, there tends to be greater flexibility at the
municipal level. Since 1994, several Qingdao municipal-level
documents have been issued on the implementation of dibao, but
in the following we will only look at the most recent one from 2004,
the Qingdao Rules (Qingdao Municipal Government, 2004). In this
document, the procedures of dibao are defined in greater detail. It
is by far the longest of all the official documents, containing 53
articles divided into 9 chapters.
The Qingdao Rules text departs significantly from the national
and provincial documents on dibao, despite proclaiming from the
beginning to be in line with the State Council’s 1999 Regulations as
17
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well as Shandong’s 2002 Measures. One difference is that the
Qingdao Rules regulate responsibilities at the four sub-municipal
levels: municipality (shi 市), district (qu 区), street (jiedao 街街), and
neighbourhood street committee (shequ juweihui 社区国社社). The
document sets various responsibilities for each level and how
various organs should cooperate with regard to statistics,
financing, etc.
The first significant difference between Qingdao and the
State Council’s Regulations relates to the status of applicants. As
mentioned earlier, it is specified in the Regulations that all qualified
people should get dibao as a “right”. That word is altered in the
Qingdao Rules, showing that municipal authorities sometimes have
a different perspective on the matter. Quoting the two articles side
by side shows the differences most clearly:
Article Two. For urban residents with non-rural
residence permits, all family members living together
with an average income below the local dibao line all
have the right to receive material assistance for basic
living from local governments (State Council, 1999).
Article Two. For residents of this city with non-rural
residence permits, all family members living together
with an average monthly income below the city’s dibao
line can apply for dibao aid (Qingdao Municipal
Government, 2004).
The two articles are clearly similar, but the changes in wording
shift the emphasis considerably. A right to receive dibao is
downgraded to a mere option to apply.
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Another considerable difference with the Regulations is in the
assessment procedures of applicant eligibility. This is given
particular attention in the Qingdao Rules with the establishment of
a new government body, the “Dibao Assessment Group” (chengshi
dibao pinggu xiaozu国市最最城城城城), which is tasked with
ensuring that eligibility criteria are thoroughly researched and
examined (art. 11). After being screened by the neighbourhood
committee, applicants are required to go to “Democratic
Community Proceedings” (shequ minzhu yishi hui社区国社社社社)
to present their cases there as well. The order of these meetings is
specified in great detail:
The normal agenda for discussing dibao applications at
the Democratic Community Proceedings is as follows:
(1) The applicant reads aloud the application form;
(2) The Dibao Assessment Group presents the results of
its assessment;
(3) Members at the meeting interrogate the applicant;
(4) The applicant answers the questions;
(5) The applicant withdraws;
(6) There is a vote by views on the assessment study
(Qingdao Municipal Government, 2004).
These proceedings all add to the stigmatization and burden of the
applicant. The public performance and examination before a panel
makes application stressful and generally unpleasant. The
screening by the Assessment Group adds additional barriers to
successful application to the programme. Regardless of the
outcome of the application, the results of the inquiry are to be
made public. This, similarly, is described in greater detail than in
any of the preceding legal documents. Once dibao is granted,
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recipient households are divided into three categories, A, B, and C,
(art. 35) and put into job-seeking services, community service, and
other programmes according to each category. This classification
does not figure in any of the other documents analysed here.
Taken as a whole, it seems that the aim of the document is to
restrict dibao as much as possible without straying too far from the
rules imposed by the State Council Regulation. The burdens of
proof of eligibility are raised considerably. These changes
demonstrate that Qingdao municipality is much less eager to push
for the expansion of dibao coverage than the central government
wishes. In a similar vein, there is little mention of dibao workers’
wrongdoings. This follows the Shandong Measures.
The Qingdao Rules also shows the degree to which the
municipal level can assert control over the implementation of
dibao. Qingdao’s municipal document is far more assertive than
the Shandong provincial documents which seem to have little
purpose other than reiterating the ordinances of the State Council.
The municipal dibao regulations are far more detailed, listing
groups

of

applicants,

income

calculations,

exceptions,

requirements, etc. The timing of the document is also remarkable.
Much like the Shandong Measures followed two years after the
1999 State Council Regulation, Qingdao’s own dibao document is
much delayed. Promulgated in August 2004, it follows nearly
three years after the provincial measures.
While such documents cannot be used to gauge the
intricacies of relative power between levels of government
bureaucracy, they do show that the State Council and the
municipal government are the most influential in determining the
shape and form of dibao. Provincial governments have relatively
little influence since the major details of implementation are all
decided at lower administrative levels. With the Regulation, the
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State Council took a big step to promote an expansion and
standardization of the programme, but on balance, it is still clearly
the local governments which have the greatest degree of control.
The documents analysed here also reveal a divide between
the intentions of the central government and municipalities such
as Qingdao. The State Council is pushing for greater coverage and
generally expands the rights of applicants at the expense of local
authorities. From the 1997 Circular to the 1999 Regulation, the State
Council broadens eligibility criteria and applicants’ rights
considerably. This is in tune with its overall intentions to expand
social welfare coverage. At the other end of the spectrum, local
governments are concerned with the rising welfare expenses, and
they generally push in the opposite direction, restricting the rights
of applicants and imposing additional burdens of qualification
before dibao can be received.
Qingdao is a large coastal municipality and relatively
wealthy. This allows it to assert a greater degree of independence.
Smaller cities are generally less specific in their regulations and
tend to rely more closely on the regulations issued by higher levels
of government. For example, Rizhao 日日, also in Shandong, has
no specific urban dibao regulations of its own. The local
government put out a document supporting the Shandong Province
Guidelines for Dibao Work (Rizhao Municipal Government, 2005),
but there is little else specific to urban dibao. This perhaps
indicates that less personnel and effort has been put into dibao
work in such places. It can also be seen as reflecting that smaller
municipalities and townships make less of an effort to distinguish
their implementations from the rules of higher government levels.
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Conclusion
Many studies have found dibao to be an ineffective social welfare
net, both in terms of coverage and actual payments. As
demonstrated here, this local discrepancy is mirrored in local
programme regulations as well. An ongoing dialogue or sparring
between the State Council and local governments has evolved as a
result. The State Council and the Ministry of Civil Affairs have
responded by issuing various statements and resolutions with
exhortations that local governments should implement the
programme more comprehensively (State Council, 2000; Ministry
of Civil Affairs, 2001). Such notices demonstrate the central
government’s resolve to promote a wider implementation of dibao.
All local districts and governments are exhorted to increase the
number of recipients and promote reemployment, ensure that
eligible people get dibao regardless of background, set up
earmarked funds, increase dibao funding, standardize the way
dibao funds are channelled to recipients, ensure that payments are
transferred in a timely fashion, strengthen the supervision of the
programme, etc.
The State Council in Beijing fully understands that dibao has
not been fully implemented nationwide, and that it has been held
back by the local authorities due to economic and political
constraints. Besides such official notices, there have been
exhortations promoting the ideal of “fully covering everybody in
need” (yingbao jinbao应最应最) (Renmin Ribao, 18 September 2001).
These notices serve as a public appeal on behalf of the destitute,
demonstrating the central government’s concern for the poor. Of
course they also highlight the problematic relationship between
centre and periphery in implementing the grand vision of
universal coverage.
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Dibao has emerged as a compromise between the interests of
central and local government levels (Guan and Xu, 2011). Behind
this compromise lies a gap between the central government’s
welfare intentions and the current implementation of the
programme at the grassroots level. While the central government
might wish for a more comprehensive social safety net to cover the
increasing numbers of uninsured poor, it is constrained by the
priorities and fiscal capacities of the provincial and municipal
governments.
Dibao was originally a local initiative and it remains largely
in the hands of local governments. As this study demonstrates,
such differences are mirrored in policy legislation. Governments at
municipal levels are able to interpret and reformulate central dibao
provisions in a highly flexible manner. As a result, policy
documents from different levels seem to enter a sort of dialogue by
copying selectively, adding new sections, and altering the
language. Welfare policies in China reflect the complex interplay
between local and central policy interests, and while no single
policy text reveals such tensions, a horizontal and vertical reading
can provide new insights into these dynamics.
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Appendices: Dibao Household in Kashgar, Xinjiang

Source: Photographs taken by Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, Summer 2006.
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